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 THE NAFTA ALTERNATIVE: 
SAVING KORUS FTA DUMPING APPEALS 
FROM THE DUMPS 
Czarina Powell* 
ABSTRACT: Antidumping duties are a trade remedy often utilized against producers in the 
United States’ own bilateral trading partners. Because of Chevron deference, foreign 
companies are at greater risk of being branded “dumpers” simply upon the onset of a petition. 
On March 15, 2013, the United States celebrated the one-year anniversary of the signing into 
force of the Korea-US (KORUS) Free Trade Agreement and its promise to eliminate barriers 
and tariffs. This article acknowledges the importance of the Republic of Korea as a U.S. 
trading partner, and proposes an alternative appeals system for dumping disputes between the 
two countries; one that embodies the spirit of the WTO Agreement, while still protecting 
American industries against harm. This article argues that the system created in the NAFTA 
binational panel is the fairest and more effective method of resolving dumping disputes. This 
article calls for the extension and implementation of NAFTA binational panels for all KORUS 
FTA dumping disputes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) today unanimously ruled 
that unlawful pricing by Samsung and LG caused injury to the U.S. clothes 
washer industry . . . .Whirlpool Corporation (NYSE: WHR) welcomes today’s 
decision, which is in response to anti-dumping and anti-subsidy petitions filed by 
the company in December 2011 on behalf of the U.S. appliance industry.”1 LG 
responded by stating “LG respects the work the ITC staff and commission have 
put into this determination, but we disagree with the result, which will harm US 
retailers and consumers.”2 
On January 23, 2013, the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) and the 
United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”) issued an antidumping 
duty order against the Republic of South Korea, on all large residential washers 
from LG Electronics, Inc., Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and Daewoo 
 
* J.D. (Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2014); Assistant State’s Attorney, 
Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, Chicago, Illinois. 
 1 Press Release, Whirlpool Corp., Victory for American Washer Industry: Ruling 
Supports U.S. Workers and Consumers (2013), http://investors.whirlpoolcorp.com/
releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=735328 [hereinafter Whirlpool Corp.]. 
 2 LG Electronics USA, LG Electronics Disputes ITC Injury Finding in Washing Machine 
Antidumping Case, PR Newswire (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases
/lg-electronics-disputes-itc-injury-finding-in-washing-machine-antidumping-case-188058261.
html. 
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Electronics Corporation. 3  Commerce, from its antidumping investigations, 
determined that the Korean corporations had sold their products at “less-than-fair 
value” in the United States, while the ITC found that the domestic industry was 
materially injured. 4  Marc Bitzer, President of Whirlpool Corporation, the 
American corporation that had initiated the antidumping petition against its 
Korean competitors, hailed the antidumping duty as “a great victory for the U.S. 
appliance industry”5 and stated that Whirlpool’s decision to petition for the trade 
remedy was premised on “defend[ing] the integrity of the global trading 
system.”6 
At first blush, the issue seems cut and dry: a foreign firm “dumps” its 
product in the U.S. market for a lower price than it sells at home; U.S. firms 
struggle to compete with this unfair trade, leading American companies to be 
injured in their own market. Upon further review, the broad grant of discretion 
bestowed upon Commerce and the ITC to determine (1) whether the foreign firm 
has “dumped,” its goods in the United States for less than they have sold them at 
home, 7  and (2) whether a U.S. industry was materially injured by this 
“dumping,”8 reveals flaws, and because of the high level of Chevron deference9 
granted to these agency decisions by the Court of International Trade and the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the dumping petition sticks: once a 
dumper, always a dumper. 
This article will argue that the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(“NAFTA”) binational panel process under NAFTA Ch. 19, created to resolve 
antidumping disputes between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, are an 
effective dispute mechanism that should be instituted and applied to antidumping 
appeals between the United States and South Korea. The five-person binational 
panel, as an alternative to the current U.S. domestic judicial review system, is 
more in-tune with World Trade Organization (“WTO”) priorities and would give 
more effect to the spirit of the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement 
(“KORUS FTA”) and free trade at large, fostering stronger relations with the 
Republic of Korea, one of the largest U.S. trading partners, while still protecting 
domestic markets against harm. The focus of this article is on the special 
binational panel appeals process the United States has carved out for Canada and 
Mexico, and the argument that these procedures should be extended to 
antidumping disputes between the U.S. and South Korea. 
 
 3 Large Residential Washers from Mexico and the Republic of Korea: Antidumping Duty 
Orders, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,148 (Feb. 15, 2013). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Whirlpool Corp., supra note 1. 
 6 See Whirlpool Corp., Defending U.S. Jobs, WhirlpoolCorp.com, http://www.
whirlpoolcorp.com/facts/. 
 7 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (2013) (stating that the “administrating authority determines 
that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold” for less than fair 
value). See also 19 U.S.C. §1677(1) (2013) (stating that “[t]he term ‘administering authority’ 
means the Secretary of Commerce”). 
 8 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2) (2013) (stating that the Commission determines material injury 
or retardation of a domestic industry). See also 19 U.S.C. §1677(2) (2013) (stating that “[t]he 
term ‘‘Commission’’ means the United States International Trade Commission”). 
 9 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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Part II of this article will assess the background of the United States’ current 
antidumping dispute system. Part III will analyze the importance of United 
States’ trade relations with South Korea and parallel it with the relations the U.S. 
has with Canada and Mexico. Part IV will analyze the NAFTA binational panels 
as an effective alternative antidumping appeals system. Part V will discuss the 
spirit of the WTO Agreement and how binational panels work better to uphold 
the ideas of free trade. Part VI will argue for the feasibility of implementing a 
binational panel for the United States and South Korea, and Part VII will 
conclude with why the antidumping binational panel is needed in lieu of the 
status quo. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE UNITED STATES’ ANTI-DUMPING SYSTEM 
The United States assesses dumping remedies according to Title VII of the 
Tariff Act.10 Dumping is defined as the sale of foreign merchandise in the United 
States “at less than its fair value” that causes material injury to or retardation of a 
U.S. industry.11 If the administrative agencies tasked with investigating dumping 
deem that dumping has taken place, they assess an antidumping duty to offset the 
difference between the product’s “normal value” and the “less than its fair 
value.” 12  The antidumping duty is levied after making “adjustments for 
differences in the merchandise, quantities purchased, and circumstances of the 
sale.”13 
A. The “interested party” petition process 
While Commerce may initiate an antidumping investigation “on its own 
motion,”14 it “rarely does.”15 Instead, a domestic company may file a petition 
with Commerce, or simultaneously with the ITC as an “interested party” on 
behalf of an industry.16 Private parties initiate more than ninety percent of all the 
antidumping cases filed.17 Once a party files a petition, the petition then proceeds 
through Commerce and the ITC according to the statutory timetable.18 While the 
statute allows for interested parties to launch petitions of their own, it is hard to 
delineate what part of the petition is done for altruistic reasons and what part is 
done to potentially curb the success of a foreign competitor. 19  There are 
 
 10 See Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590, Title VII, updated through 
Pub. L. No. 103-465 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673a) (2013). 
 11 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2013). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See Robert Carpenter, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Antidumping and Countervailing 
Handbook, I-3, note 2 (13th ed. 2008). 
 14 Id. at II-4, note 8. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a)(1) (2013). 
 15 Carpenter, supra note 13, at II-4, note 8. 
 16 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)1 (2013). 
 17 See Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal The Antidumping Laws, 13 Nw. J. Int’l L. & 
Bus. 491 at 547 (1993). 
 18 See infra Figure 1, note 30. 
 19 See McGee, supra note 17, at 547-48, 551 (suggesting that as “[n]early all of the 
ANTIDUMPING petitions that U.S. companies file with the Commerce Department result in an 
investigation,” coupled with the fact that “companies are never penalized for submitting 
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underlying notions that “antidumping is not about remedying unfair trade 
practices . . . but about protecting the domestic products of the importing 
country.”20 
Whirlpool, in the example given at start of this article, signed a petition on 
March 11, 2011 directed to James R. Holbein, Acting Secretary of the ITC, 
requesting that Korean and Mexican corporations be investigated for their 
“Bottom Mount Combination Refrigerator-Freezers” originating in the Republic 
of Korea and Mexico.21 While it seems anti-competitive for a domestic U.S. 
company to petition the U.S. government for relief against a foreign competitor, 
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine gives private parties immunity “from antitrust 
scrutiny when they lobby the government for certain benefits, even if the 
lobbying inhibits competition.”22 Whirlpool Corporation would be shielded from 
accusations that it initiated the antidumping petition against South Korean 
corporations due to “trade-restraining behaviors.”23 There is a “sham” exception 
to this protection. However, the exception has been limited to applying only to 
the antidumping process, not the outcome.24 This limitation lends fuel to the 
argument that those industries that petition against dumping on the basis of 
“unfair trade” are in fact, seeking [unfair] protection from foreign rivals.25 
It is this self-interested petitioning that launches antidumping investigations 
and because of the deference the federal courts give to administrative agencies, 
foreign competitors are essentially branded with a scarlet “D” once a U.S. 
domestic industry views it as a threat. 
B. A Discretionary Investigation Process 
Once a petition has been initiated, Commerce and the ITC decide whether to 
pursue an investigation by making preliminary determinations as to (1) whether 
there is dumping, and (2) whether a U.S. industry has been materially injured by 
it. 26  While the timetable for the preliminary and final determinations is 
 
incorrect or knowingly false information,” lending to the notion that domestic U.S. industries 
are “using government as a club - to batter [their] opponents and get what [they] want,” 
bringing into question the “[e]thics of [u]sing the [A]NTIDUMPING [l]aws as a [w]eapon”). 
 20 Wentong Zheng, Reforming Trade Remedies, 34 Mich. J. Int’l L. 151, 156-157 (2012) 
[hereinafter Zheng]. 
 21 Bottom Mount Combination Refrigerator Freezers from Korea and Mexico, USITC 
Investigation Nos. 701-TA-477 and 731-TA-1180-1181 (Final), United States International 
Trade Commission Pub. 4318 (May 2012). 
 22 Sungjoon Cho, Anticompetitive Trade Remedies: How Antidumping Measures Obstruct 
Market Competition, 87 N.C.L. Rev. 357 at 361 (2009) [hereinafter Cho]. See also Eastern R. 
Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (holding that competitors 
seeking to influence public officials did not amount to illegal anticompetitive conduct under 
the Sherman Act); United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) 
(holding that a party who petitions the government for action favorable to themselves cannot 
be sued under the Sherman Anti Trust Act, even if anti-competitiveness may be the motivating 
factor behind the party’s actions). 
 23 See Cho, id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Diane P. Wood, “Unfair” Trade Injury: A Competition-Based Approach, 41 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1153 at 1171 (1989). 
 26 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b (2013). 
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systematic and structured,27 Commerce and the ITC, as administrative agencies, 
are granted wide, discretionary berth when determining the application of the 
antidumping statutes.28 
U.S. antidumping duties have been attacked as flawed on multiple fronts,29 
and although the specifics of the issues are beyond the scope of this article, they 
are numerous and further fuel the argument that foreign companies are not 
afforded an effective appeals system because these agency decisions are upheld. 
 
Figure 1: Antidumping Timetable in days.30 
 
 27 See infra Figure 1 & note 31. 
 28 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(regarding the second prong of the Chevron test that states where Congress has not spoken 
specifically to the matter, that the administrative agency has discretion to interpret at will, and 
courts will uphold the interpretation as long as reasonable) [hereinafter Chevron]. See also 
Tariff Act of 1930, § 771(7)(C)(ii)(I–II), as amended, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(7)(C)(ii)(I–III) 
(establishing the ITC’s broad discretion to assess evidence on price undercutting in its 
investigation and the “dumping” impact on the domestic industry). 
 29 See generally Zheng, supra note 20, at 158 (arguing to eliminate the unfair pricing 
mechanism). See also Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & 
Econ. 1, 14 (1995) (arguing that “[a]s long as the exporter’s marginal revenue from sales in the 
importing country exceeds its marginal cost of production, the exporter is behaving in an 
economically rational fashion”); Edward Tracy, NAFTA Chapter 19 Binational Panel Reviews 
– Still a Zero Sum Game: The Wire Rod Decision and its Progeny, 27 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 
173, 177 (2012) (arguing that “[d]espite a vast body of international jurisprudence outlawing 
zeroing, U.S. courts sanctioned the practice”) [hereinafter Tracy].  
      30   UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, STATUTORY TIMETABLES FOR 
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C. The Appellate Process: Chevron Deference Solidifies Agency Discretion 
Once the DOC or the ITC has issued positive antidumping duty orders 
against the foreign company, the foreign company may petition either agency to 
appeal.31 The importer has thirty days after the publication of the antidumping 
duty order to challenge the assessment of the antidumping duty on its 
merchandise.32 The Court of International Trade has jurisdiction to hear appeals 
of antidumping, as does the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.33 
While there is an appeals process in place, courts give great deference to the 
administrative agencies due to the Chevron doctrine.34 Accordingly, tremendous 
deference is given to the expertise of the Secretary of Commerce in 
administering the antidumping law.35 Courts will only overturn agency action if 
the action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”36 This standard of review is narrow.37 The court will not 
substitute its own judgment for the agency, and the court will look to whether the 
agency has provided a rational link between the evidence before it and the 
decision the agency made.38 The court will uphold a decision of “less than ideal 
clarity” and will only overturn if the agency: 
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the 
agency, or [offered an explanation that] is so implausible that it could not 
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.39 
The Chevron test is premised on two holdings: (1) if Congress’ intention was 
clear from the statute then the plain language controls, and (2) if the statute is 
ambiguous or silent on the issue at hand, then the agency’s interpretation will be 
adopted as the interpretation of the statute, as long as it is reasonable.40 Under 28 
U.S.C. § 2643(b), the Court of International Trade must sometimes review issues 
de novo: 
 
ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY INVESTIGATIONS (2014), http://www.usitc.gov/
trade_remedy/documents/timetable.pdf. 
 31 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b)(1) (2013). 
 32 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673e, 1516a(a)(2) (2013). 
 33 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(c), 1295(a)(5) (2013). 
 34 See Chevron, supra note 28. 
 35 See Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. Int’l Union of Elec., Elec., Tech., Salaried & Mach. Workers, 
6 F.3d 1511 at 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1993). See also Smith-Corona v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568 
at 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 36 U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 at 229 (2001). See also Administrative Procedure 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2013) (stating “the reviewing court shall -- (2) hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be -- (A) arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). 
 37 See Nat’l Fisheries Inst., Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 637 F. Supp. 
2d 1270, 1285 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009). 
 38 Id. at 1286. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See Chevron, supra note 28. 
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If the Court of International Trade is unable to determine the correct 
decision on the basis of the evidence presented in any civil action, the court 
may order a retrial or rehearing for all purposes, or may order such further 
administrative or adjudicative procedures as the court considers necessary 
to reach the correct decision.41 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that courts can still give deference to an 
agency’s regulations while simultaneously reviewing the facts anew. 42 
“Deference can be given to the [agency’s] regulations without impairing the 
authority of the court to make factual determinations, and to apply those 
determinations to the law, de novo.”43 This implicates foreign exporters and their 
ability to fight the antidumping duties in the current appeals system. An agency 
determination is given great weight, and even in cases where the issues are to be 
determined by the reviewing court de novo, agency regulations will be worked 
into the legal framework that analyze the facts of the case. This makes it nearly 
impossible to have an agency decision overturned, reinforcing the notion that 
once petitioned against, the “dumper” is doomed. 
Even in cases where plaintiffs have proven that the antidumping duty should 
be revoked, Commerce retains “unfettered discretion” as to whether to maintain 
the duty, and it “may” revoke the duty if it so chooses.44  The Secretary of 
Commerce is not required to grant revocation, even if it is warranted.45 When 
reviewing final “material injury” determinations, the reviewing court must give 
the ITC “appropriate deference in its interpretation of the material injury 
statute.”46 In the instances where the Court of International Trade or the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit find that the ITC duty was not supported by 
“substantial evidence,”47 the courts remand the determinations back to the agency 
for reconsideration.48 In only two cases has the ITC “reversed a final injury 
decision in response to a court remand for reconsideration.” 49  The outlook 
continues to be bleak for foreign companies. 
D. Changed Circumstance and The Sunset Clause 
Commerce may revoke an antidumping duty if “changed circumstances” 
warrant revocation or if “a majority of U.S. producers have expressed a lack of 
interest in continued enforcement of the antidumping order.50 Commerce granted 
revocation in seventy-six cases from January 1995 to December 2009; however, 
 
 41 28 U.S.C. § 2643(b) (2013). 
 42 United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 at 381 (1999). 
 43 Id. at 390-92. 
 44 See Toshiba Corp. v. United States, 15 C.I.T. 597 at 598 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1991). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Nucor Corp. v. United States, 318 F.Supp.2d 1207, 1212 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004) aff’d, 
414 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 47 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (stating that any determination or finding that is 
unsupported by substantial evidence shall be held unlawful). 
 48 See Jay Charles Campbell, The Trade Litigant’s Gauntlet: The Hanging Judge and the 
Teflon Tribunal, 31 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 1, 42 (2011) [hereinafter Campbell]. 
 49 Id. at 42, 43. 
 50 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b)(1); 19 C.F.R. §351.222(g). 
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in all cases revocation occurred because of the U.S. industry’s lack of interest in 
the continued order, and only one case involved “changed circumstances”.51 
Antidumping duties must also be reviewed at a five year mandatory “sunset 
review.”52 In the sunset review, the ITC must revoke the antidumping order53 
unless it decides that such revocation would lead to continuation or recurrence of 
dumping “within a reasonably foreseeable time,”54 or if it would lead to the 
continuation or recurrence of material injury to the U.S. industry.55 From July 
1998 to May 2005, Commerce found that U.S. industries favored continuation of 
every case, all 255, in their sunset reviews.56 Once found to be a dumper, you 
will so be branded and penalized for the indefinite future. 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S. FREE TRADE PARTNERS TO ITS PROSPERITY 
A. Korea: KORUS FTA 
In terms of overall trade, as of March 2013, South Korea is the United States 
number six trading partner, and number eight in terms of total exports. 57 
According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, on March 15, 
2013, the one-year anniversary of the Korea-United States (KORUS) FTA’s 
entry into force, the KORUS FTA “[was] living up to its promise to provide 
tangible benefits for American businesses and workers . . . [and] also supporting 
U.S. exports of goods and services.” 58  U.S. exports to South Korea have 
increased in just one year in the manufacturing, transportation equipment, and 
agricultural sectors.59 
The KORUS FTA was signed on June 30, 2007, approved by Congress on 
October 12, 2011, approved the Korea National Assembly on November 22, 
2011,60 and the agreement entered into force on March 15, 2012.61 President 
Obama announced that the KORUS FTA was “a landmark trade deal that [was] 
expected to increase annual exports of American goods by up to $11 million and 
support at least 70,000 American jobs.”62 Actual figures for U.S. manufacturing 
exports to Korea were $34.3 billion for 2011, and $34.8 billion for 2012.63 
 
 51 See Campbell, supra note 48, at 32. 
 52 See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c). 
 53 Id. 
 54 See 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a). 
 55 See 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(c). 
 56 See Campbell, supra note 48, at 33. 
 57 See Top Trading Partners - Total Trade, Exports, Imports, U.S. Census Bureau (May 2, 
2013), http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1305cm.html. 
 58 See Fact Sheet: U.S.-Korea Agreement Bringing Benefits Home, Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative (May 7, 2013), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/
2013/march/us-korea-agreement-bringing-benefits. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: New Opportunities for U.S. Exporters Under 
the U.S.-Korea Trade Agreement, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, http://www.
ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Barack Obama, President of the United States, The White House, Office of the Press 
Sec’y, Statement by the President Announcing the US-Korea Trade Agreement (Dec. 3, 2010), 
9
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For the United States, the incentive to enter into a bilateral trade agreement 
with South Korea was Korea’s appeal as a major export market for U.S. goods.64 
To that end, ninety-five percent of all Korean tariffs on U.S. exports will be 
eliminated by January 1, 2016.65 Specifically, the KORUS FTA was intended to 
gain U.S. access to the Korean market for the American car and truck industry 
and U.S. agricultural products.66 President Obama also stated that the KORUS 
FTA would “deepen[] the strong alliance between the United States and the 
Republic of Korea.”67 
While Korea’s importance as a trading partner is apparent, Korea is still 
subject to the United States’ antidumping duties. In fact, from 1985 to 2005, “US 
$37.3 billion worth of Korean exports were subject to U.S. trade measures[.]”68 
These penalties do not exist in a vacuum, and because of the inability to 
effectively appeal such charges, Korea is simultaneously being applauded as a 
trading partner while being punished as a trade infringer. 
B. Canada and Mexico: NAFTA, a Parallel System 
Canada, like South Korea, is an important trading partner to the United 
States. As of March 2013, Canada was the United States’ top trading partner in 
terms of overall trade and the exports of goods.69 Mexico, in March 2013, was 
the third for overall trade with the United States and second for the export of 
U.S. goods.70 On January 1, 1994, NAFTA entered into force and by January 1, 
2008, all remaining duties and restrictions were eliminated.71 “NAFTA created 
the world’s largest free trade area . . . producing $17 trillion worth of goods and 
services.”72 The United States’ incentive was to capitalize on the export of its 
goods,73 and NAFTA has been a success story in achieving that end. “U.S. goods 
export[ed] to NAFTA [countries] in 2010 were $411.5 billion, up 23.4% ($78 
billion) from 2009, and 149% from 1994 (the year prior to Uruguay Round) and 
up 190% from 1993 (the year prior to NAFTA). U.S. exports to NAFTA 
accounted for 32.2% of overall U.S. exports in 2010.”74 
 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/03/statement-president-announcing-us-
korea-trade-agreement. 
 63 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 60. 
 64 See Yong-Shik Lee et. al., The United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement: Path to 
Common Economic Prosperity or False Promise? 6 E. Asia L. Rev. 111, 118 (2011) 
[hereinafter Lee]. 
 65 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 60. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See Lee, supra note 63, at n.84. 
 69 See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 56. 
 70 See id. 
 71 See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-
free-trade-agreement-nafta. 
 72 Id. 
 73 See Matthew Burton, Assigning the Judicial Power to International Tribunals: NAFTA 
Binational Panels and Foreign Affairs Flexibility, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1529 at 1548 (2002). 
 74 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 71. 
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Beyond the general objective of obtaining “preferential treatment for United 
States goods,” the United States also listed in its assessment of NAFTA’s 
benefits “monitoring and effective dispute settlement mechanisms to facilitate 
compliance with . . . ”, the elimination of barriers to market access for U.S. 
goods, the elimination of foreign subsidies potentially injurious to U.S. 
industries, and the elimination of export taxes.75  The finalized NAFTA lists 
among its objectives the elimination of barriers to trade between the party 
territories,76 and the creation of “effective procedures for the implementation and 
application of this Agreement, for its joint administration and for the resolution 
of disputes.”77 The dispute mechanism was one that embraced negotiation and an 
alternative diversion procedure for anti-dumping and countervailing duty matters 
away from U.S. courts and towards a more inclusive bilateral process. That 
mechanism was the NAFTA binational panel process. 
While Canada initially sought complete exemption from U.S. antidumping 
duties for its exporters, it was finally able to compromise with the United States 
on the binational panel system,78 and so the binational panel, originally instituted 
under the Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Canada, was 
modified and adopted for NAFTA to include both countries’ relations with 
Mexico.79 The U.S. supported the binational panel on the basis that it would 
“make dispute resolution more efficient, and thereby mak[ing] the trading bloc 
more efficient.”80 Thus, a compromise was struck between Canada’s desire to 
have NAFTA as a common trading area where the laws of neither country would 
apply, and the U.S.’s desire for Canada to “eliminate all Canadian government 
subsidy programs.”81 
IV. THE NAFTA BINATIONAL PANEL: AN EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE 
APPELLATE MECHANISM 
Binational panels are currently only available in the U.S. to NAFTA 
countries (Canada and Mexico) when disputing positive findings of (1) dumping 
and (2) material injury to the U.S. domestic market.82 Chapter 19 of NAFTA 
allows for binational panel proceedings as an alternative to the current dumping 
appeals process of judicial review in U.S. domestic courts.83 
 
 75 See H.R.3450, 3450—11, 103d Cong. § 108(5)(a),(k) (1993), GPO.Gov, 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-103hr3450enr/pdf/BILLS-103hr3450enr.pdf. 
 76 See Chapter One: Objectives, article 102(1)(a), NAFTA Secretariat, (May 13, 2013), 
https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=97&ctl=FullView&mid=1214&language
=en-US&#b55964ef-f08f-4554-a1a9-9bc888941cdc. 
 77 Id. at art. 102(e). 
 78 See Eric J. Pan, Assessing the NAFTA Chapter 19 Binational Panel System: An 
Experiment in International Adjudication, 40 Harv. Int’l L.J. 379, 383 (1999) [hereinafter 
Pan]. 
 79 Id. at 384. 
 80 See Burton, supra note 73, at 1549, n.82. 
 81 See id. 
 82 See generally Tracy, supra note 29, at 186. 
 83 North American Free Trade Agreement, pmbl., chp. 19, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 
107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
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Under NAFTA Article 1904, a petitioner that disagrees with: “alleged 
injury” from Commerce and the ITC in the United States may opt for binational 
panel review instead of the regular U.S. judicial review system.84 While a party 
may opt for a panel in lieu of judges, the panels are tasked with applying “the 
importing party’s domestic antidumping law.”85 In most cases, the binational 
panels uphold Commerce decisions. However on unresolved matters of law or 
determinations lacking evidence, the panelists are more likely to step away from 
U.S. law and apply past binational panel precedent.86 
Each of the NAFTA nations must keep an ongoing roster of lawyers in good 
standing that may serve on the five-member binational panel. During a dispute, 
each country appoints two panelists, and the two countries agree on the fifth 
panelist.87 The countries have 55 days from the request for a panel to agree on 
the fifth member, but if they cannot agree, they must draw lots to decide, by the 
61st day, who will be the fifth panelist.88 The panel, in its ruling, can uphold 
agency action or send back to the agency for further action.89 The timeline that 
the panel follows is one intended to speed up the process of appealing final 
antidumping duties.90 
Once a binational panel has issued a determination, the ITC “shall within the 
period specified by the panel or committee, take action not inconsistent with the 
decision of the panel or committee.”91 Furthermore, binational panel decisions 
are not subject to domestic judicial review and “no court of the United States 
shall have power or jurisdiction to review such action on any question of law or 
fact by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.” 92  But, strictly 
speaking, panels do not bind future panels.93 
In situations where the parties dispute the binational panel’s ruling, there is a 
three-person Extraordinary Challenge Committee available, but reviews under 
the auspices of this appeals panel are rare.94 The party’s government may petition 
for this extraordinary measure if it feels there was a conflict of interest, or if 
there was a fundamental departure from a rule of procedure.95  
 
 84 See Tracy, supra note 29, at 177. 
 85 Id. 
 86 See Pan, supra note 78, at 445. 
 87 See NAFTA Secretariat, supra note 75, at annex 1901.2. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See Tracy, supra note 29, at 188. 
 90 See Angel R. Oquendo, The Comparative and the Critical Perspective in International 
Agreements, 15 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 205 at 218 (1997). 
 91 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(7)(A). 
 92 Id. 
 93 See Tracy, supra note 29, at 187, n.74 (citing to NAFTA art. 1904, para. 9 indicating the 
case’s concern with “the Involved Parties with respect to the particular matter between the 
Parties that is before the panel”). 
 94 Id. at 188. 
 95 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 70, Chap. 19, annex 1904.13. 
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Ideal Timeline for a NAFTA Chapter 19 Panel Review as per the Rules of 
Procedure 
 
R. 34 Request for Panel Review filed Day 0 
R. 39 Complaints to be filed Within 30 days after 
Request for Panel Review 
R. 40 Notices of Appearance to be filed Within 45 days after 
Request for Panel Review 
Annex 
1901.2(3) 
Panel Selection to be completed by 
the Parties by 
Day 55 
R. 41 Final Determination, Reasons, Index 
and Administrative Record to be 
filed 
Within 15 days after filing 
of Notice of Appearance 
Annex 
1901.2(3) 
Parties to select 5th Panelist by Day 61 
R. 57 (1) Briefs by Complainants to be filed Within 60 days after filing 
of Administrative Record 
R. 57(2) Briefs by Investigating Authority or 
Participants in support to be filed 
Within 60 days after 
Complainants’ Briefs 
R. 57(3) Reply Briefs to be filed Within 15 days after 
Authority’s Briefs 
R. 57(4) Appendix to the Briefs to be filed Within 10 days after Reply 
Briefs 
R. 67(1) Oral Argument to begin Within 30 days after Reply 
Briefs 
Article 
1904.14 
PANEL DECISION DUE 315 days after Request for 
Panel Review 
Figure 2: NAFTA Binational Panel Sample Schedule for appealing antidumping 
duties.96 
 
This article argues that binational panels should be further expanded and 
implemented for those countries with whom the U.S. has negotiated special 
bilateral agreements, such as the Republic of Korea through the KORUS FTA. 
This will foster trade relations with the largest U.S. trading partners, while still 
protecting domestic markets against harm. 
 
 96 See NAFTA Secretariat, supra note 76. 
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V. THE BINATIONAL PANEL: EMBODIMENT OF THE WTO SPIRIT 
In this era of global free trade, the trend has become to reduce tariffs through 
trade agreements, yet simultaneously to use trade remedies as a backstop against 
the same trading partners.97 In the face of this, the WTO Agreement continues to 
stand for the notion that global trade should be unrestricted.98 While the WTO 
Agreement upholds the ideals of free trade, it also acknowledges the continuation 
of certain non-tariff barriers, such as antidumping duties.99 Similar to the United 
States’ dumping provisions, antidumping duties are assessed under the WTO 
Agreement when a member country can show that an item was imported into the 
country in question for less than fair value.100 The WTO Agreement allows each 
Member country the discretion to establish a unique national antidumping 
regime, but nonetheless requires Members to adhere to core precepts in order to 
ensure a substantial degree of consistency and uniformity amongst the Member 
regimes.101 
The United States is a signatory to the antidumping provisions in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“GATT”) 102  and the Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the GATT (the WTO Antidumping 
Agreement),103 which hammer out guidelines for WTO Members in adjudicating 
antidumping disputes and assessing subsequent duties. Countries are free to 
administer their own antidumping laws as long as they comply with the terms of 
the WTO Antidumping Agreement.104 
The U.S. felt that Article VI of the GATT diluted the original antidumping 
authority given to nations.105 The U.S. position on the GATT panels shifted from 
the early 1980s, when the United States was winning antidumping conflicts over 
other countries, to the late 1980s, where panel decisions went against the U.S. 
and U.S. negotiators opted instead to support deference to national authority 
decisions.106 Nevertheless, the United States has since amended its own domestic 
 
 97 See Zheng, supra note 20, at 155. 
 98 See Reid M. Bolton, Anti-Dumping and Distrust: Reducing Anti-Dumping Duties under 
the W.T.O. Through Heightened Scrutiny, 29 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 66, 70 (2011) [hereinafter 
Bolton]. 
 99 Id. 
 100 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 
(1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
 101 See Christopher F. Corr, Trade Protectionism in the New Millennium: The Ascendency 
of Antidumping Measures, 18 NW. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 49 at 75 (1997). 
 102 See GATT, supra note 100. 
 103 See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994, 68 U.N.T.S. 201 (1994). 
 104 See Paul C. Rosenthal & Robert T.C. Vermylen, The WTO Antidumping and Subsidies 
Agreements: Did the United States Achieve its Objectives During the Uruguay Round?, 31 
Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 871 at 872 (2000). 
 105 Id. at 871. 
 106 Id. 
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antidumping law,107 effectively implementing the system prescribed by the WTO 
Agreement, “except as specifically noted.”108 
In addition to domestic remedies that a country may enact, the WTO 
Agreement has a Dispute Settlement Body 109  that members may petition to 
resolve trade issues. 110  The procedure involves first, a consultation with the 
disputing country, and then the country may seek a dispute resolution panel 
under the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes. 111  The WTO panels are enforceable under binding 
dispute resolution.112 This Dispute Settlement Body is utilized by various WTO 
members, and it encourages settlement of disputes, resembling the NAFTA 
binational panel process. 
Since 1995 the United States has referred 13 antidumping matters involving 
Korea to the WTO dispute settlement system, Korea has likewise initiated 32 
against the United States.113 While the WTO does provide this alternative dispute 
mechanism, “[t]he standard of review by panels (and by the Appellate Body) in 
most WTO proceedings is considerably broader than the general standard in the 
United States for review of administrative decisions . . . [.]”114 Much of the U.S. 
scholarly criticism about NAFTA binational panels concerns panelists’ utilizing 
the “correct” standard of review, the U.S. Chevron standard. Having KORUS 
FTA disputes go before the WTO dispute settlement system could potentially 
attract a more neutral standard of review. 
VI. FEASIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING A BINATIONAL PANEL FOR THE KORUS 
FTA 
Arguments against the application of a binational panel process between 
Korea and the United States include the fact that binational panels are not 
favored by many American trade authors.115 Accusations have been that (A) the 
differences in culture and laws will make it difficult to maintain a separate 
appellate panel, and (B) that it is undesirable to leave trade remedies in the hands 
of panelists who are not judges, but rather professionals who may misapply U.S. 
 
 107 See Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 Title VII, updated through Pub. 
L. No. 103-465 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673a), supra note 10. 
 108 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 529 F. Supp 670, 673 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
1981). 
 109 See Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 2001, 19 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. 
Law 457 at 470 (2002) [hereinafter Bhala & Gantz]. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 See Bolton, supra note 98, at 76. 
 113 Anti-dumping Initiations: Reporting Member vs Exporting Country 01/01/1995 - 
31/12/2012, WTO, WTO.Org, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/AD_InitiationsRep
MemVsExpCty.pdf. 
 114 See Bhala & Gantz, supra note 109, at 615. 
 115 See generally Tracy, supra note 29, at 187, n.74 (citing NAFTA art. 1904, para. 9, 
which states “the Involved Parties with respect to the particular matter between the Parties that 
is before the panel”). 
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domestic law, and (C) that the antidumping system is inherently flawed and its 
complete disbandment is desirable to all other solutions. 
A. Overcoming Differences 
1. Language 
Arguments against the implementation of a separate binational panel process 
for the KORUS-FTA may include the language hurdle of having panelists versed 
in both English and Korean. Under the NAFTA binational panels, proceedings 
for the United States and Canada can take place in both English and French.116 
Mexico has experienced similar barriers, but the procedural leniency in NAFTA 
would also allow for proceedings in Spanish, if parties so chose.117 The NAFTA 
experience of these proceedings taking place in different languages can help 
Korea and the United States institute a binational panel in both languages, 
without pioneering the notion. 
2. Legal Systems 
Arguments against the feasibility of a binational panel may also emphasize 
that Korea is a civil law country whereas the United States works under a 
common law system.118 While the legal systems are different, South Korea’s 
administrative and corporate laws are modeled after the United States system.119 
Additionally, the NAFTA binational panels, as an example, draw from the same 
pool of professionals as WTO dispute settlement panels. This indicates that the 
roster for a potential KORUS FTA antidumping binational panel can get a 
running start by drawing from the WTO Dispute Settlement Body roster. 120 
Furthermore, Mexican WTO panelists have transitioned onto the NAFTA 
binational panels with ease.121 As of 1999, five of seven NAFTA decisions were 
authored, in part, by Mexican panelists, indicating no cultural or legal 
difficulty.122 
There is already a system in place in the KORUS FTA that allows for 
investor-state dispute settlement between investors and either the United States 
or Korean governments, as the case may be. 123  Korea and the U.S. afford 
investors domestic-like treatment,124 and for dispute settlements, either countries’ 
investors can seek arbitration panels, appointed by the Secretary General of the 
 
 116 See Oquendo, supra note 90, at 220, 221. 
 117 Id. at 221. 
 118 See Katherine Wang, The Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Motivations for Investor-
State Dispute Settlement Provisions, 18 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 505 at 518 (2012). 
 119 Id. at 521. 
 120 See WTO, supra note 113. 
 121 See Pan, supra note 78, at 441. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Jeanne J. Grimmet, Dispute Settlement in the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement 
(KORUS FTA), Congressional Research Service 1 (2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row
/R41779.pdf [hereinafter Grimmet]. 
 124 KORUS FTA, Chapter 11, Section A: Investment, Article 11.3, Office of the United 
States Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/
korus/asset_upload_file587_12710.pdf. 
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International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. 125  A similar 
provision was included in the NAFTA, and while some authorities cite the cost 
and the inconvenience to the United States, “[t]o date, the United States has 
prevailed in all investor-state cases brought against it.126 This system provides 
yet another foundation for an alternative dispute system for antidumping appeals. 
B. Trade Practitioners Versus Judges 
While those who serve on the NAFTA binational panels are not judges, they 
are experienced legal professionals who remain on the country’s NAFTA 
binational panel roster in case their services are needed.127 Some legal scholars 
have noted that rather than having full-time judges on the panel, panelists are 
individuals who must balance jobs outside the panel with their job as panelists.128 
Cross-referencing the NAFTA binational panels and the WTO antidumping 
dispute panels show that over half the names appear on both panels for the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico.129 While they may not be judges, they will 
have a better understanding of legal issues if they participate in antidumping 
proceedings in two different legal settings. 
Furthermore, the accusation that panelists do not apply American law as 
consistently as judges has led some critics to point to the Wire Rod case.130 One 
critic argued that the binational panel “broke with NAFTA directives” by 
applying WTO law over binding U.S. law,131 although Commerce later got rid of 
the controversial methodology for the assessment of dumping at issue in Wire 
Rod.132 A critic of the Wire Rod case admitted that the binational panel used the 
first Chevron prong in assessing whether there was dumping, but because the 
panel decided that Congress explicitly denounced zeroing and that Commerce 
violated the explicit rule by assessing dumping penalties using this method of 
calculation, the author felt that this was not the application of the rule as U.S. 
judges would have concluded.133 This argument, even if taken in the light most 
favorable to this critic, does not demonstrate that the panel failed to apply U.S. 
law, as the panel did undertake a Chevron analysis. The author’s argument thus 
 
 125 Id. at Section B: Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Articles 11.15-11.25. 
 126 See Grimmet, supra note 123, at 6. 
 127 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 71, Chapter 19, annex 1901.2 
 128 See Juscelino F. Colares & John W. Bohn, NAFTA’s Double Standards of Review, 42 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 199, 221 (2007). 
 129 See WTO, supra note 113. 
 130 See Binational Panel Review of Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Wire Rod from Canada, 
USA-CDA-2008-1904-02, 2 (May 11, 2012) [hereinafter Wire Rod] (originally remanding the 
case to Commerce with regards to “zeroing,” however ultimately affirmed Commerce’s 
decision). 
 131 See Tracy, supra note 29, at 176. 
 132 See 77 F.R. 8101-01, Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average 
Dumping Margin and Assessment Rate in Certain Antidumping Duty Proceedings; Final 
Modification (Feb. 14, 2012) (demonstrating how Commerce changed the way it calculated 
dumping, from a system that was based on weighted-average margins of exports while offsets 
for non-dumped comparisons were not factored (“zeroing), running inconsistent with WTO 
mandates, prompting Commerce to undertake new methodologies that paralleled the WTO). 
 133 Id. at 191-192. 
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seems premised on the disappointment that the American industry did not 
emerge victorious. 
While the binational panel decision itself is not reviewable,134 NAFTA does 
grant “exclusive original jurisdiction over constitutional attacks on binational 
panels” to the United States for the District of Columbia Circuit.135 If either 
country in the proceeding felt there was a constitutional issue at hand in an 
appeal of a U.S. antidumping determination, they could file a constitutional 
action before the D.C. Circuit within thirty days of final notice publication in the 
Federal Register of the completion of the binational panel.136 
C. Scrapping the System Entirely: Impractical 
While there is much scholarship for repealing antidumping remedies 
altogether, this article is written with awareness that doing so would be 
“politically infeasible in the current protectionist atmosphere of Congress.”137 
This article acknowledges that eliminating trade remedies altogether is an 
impractical solution since even the WTO Agreement recognizes antidumping 
duties as a valid trade remedy and has its own system of review of antidumping 
determinations.138 
This article argues that for the United States’ largest trading partners - 
Canada, Mexico, and if extended, Korea - binational panels are a more effective 
way of dealing with trade disputes that arise. Binational panels are an alternative 
appeals system that sufficiently acknowledge the special trade relationships that 
the United States has. Carving out this exception would ensure that its biggest 
trade allies are not subjected to the stigma and penalties of being branded and 
penalized as dumpers under the current rigged system. 
VII. CONCLUSION: THE UNTENABLE STATUS QUO 
The United States is celebrating the successful first anniversary of prosperity 
and enhanced exports with the Republic of Korea under the KORUS FTA. The 
elimination of trade duties on the front end are shouted from the rafters, but a 
prejudicial backstop remains. 
The current antidumping system in U.S. law has effectively handicapped the 
ability of U.S. trading partners to appeal petitions against them. There will 
always be self-interest at play in trade relations, but if the United States 
continues to allow domestic corporations to petition the Commission and the ITC 
to cut out the competition, then foreign competitors are doomed from the start: 
once a dumper, always a dumper. Court deference to agencies under the Chevron 
 
 134 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(2)(A)-(B) (stating “if binational panel review of a 
determination is requested pursuant to article 1904 of the NAFTA or of the Agreement, then 
. . . the determination is not reviewable under subsection (a) of this section, and . . . no court of 
the United States has power or jurisdiction to review the determination on any question of law 
or fact by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise”). 
 135 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(A). 
 136 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(C). 
 137 See Cho, supra note 22, at 362. 
 138 See Bolton, supra note 98. 
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principle has made appeals virtually impossible. However, in the specific 
instance of the NAFTA binational panel process, the United States has 
acknowledged the special trade relationship it has with its North American 
counterparts and carved out an exception to its own impenetrable system. 
This exception should be applied to Korea and binational panels should be 
implemented for antidumping disputes under the KORUS FTA. The barriers to 
establishing the panel are not insurmountable and much of the ground work has 
already been laid with Canada and Mexico. For the United States to continue to 
refuse to acknowledge the hypocrisy of knocking down Korean trade barriers, 
while simultaneously fortifying its wall against Korean exports would be to go 
against the very spirit of the free trade movement championed by the WTO 
Agreement. Binational panels are a simple solution to a continuing trade 
injustice. 
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